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    <title>I Told You So, Volume 1 - cloud-mitigation</title>
    <subtitle>Archive, Volume 1: conference talks and papers on security and risk, 2010 to 2018.</subtitle>
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    <updated>2013-10-18T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
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        <title>DDoS Survival</title>
        <published>2013-10-18T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2013-10-18T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
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              Unknown
            
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        <content type="html" xml:base="https://blog.itys.net/vol1/posts/ddos-survival-isc2tc/">&lt;h2 id=&quot;summary&quot;&gt;Summary&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Matthew J. Harmon and Phil Reno present at the (ISC)2 Twin Cities Area Chapter
on DDoS Survival, delivered on October 18, 2013, provides a comprehensive primer
on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and how organizations can
withstand and mitigate them. It begins by defining DDoS as resource exhaustion
aimed at disrupting servicesand tracing its roots from IRC-driven pranks to
sophisticated protest and extortion campaigns.&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&quot;threats-and-attack-techniques&quot;&gt;Threats and Attack Techniques&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first section surveys real-world threats and attack techniques. The
presenters highlight notable incidents such as Anonymous&#x2F;AntiSec campaigns and
itsoknoproblembro browser-based botnets and reference data on rising attack
volumes from sources like Arbor Networks. They categorize attack vectors across
the OSI stack (TCP&#x2F;SSL floods, HTTP-level assaults like Slowloris and
chunked-header exploits, and ICMP&#x2F;UDP floods) and assess attacker skill levels,
from low-effort LOIC&#x2F;XOIC scripts to more advanced injection-driven browser
botnets.&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&quot;defense-and-resilience&quot;&gt;Defense and Resilience&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second section focuses on defense and resilience strategies. Harmon and Reno
outline four architectural approaches: ISP-level scrubbing, Cloud SOC via
proxy&#x2F;DNS redirection, full-service cloud scrubbing with BGP rerouting, and
in-house solutions. Detailing the pros and cons of each. They emphasize risk
transference through CDNs and anti-DDoS services, null-routing tactics, and
bigger pipes, supplemented by application-level tweaks. The presentation
concludes with guidance on selecting providers (key questions on SLAs,
mitigation capabilities, and cost structures), proactive load testing, and
leveraging automation tools (Chef, Puppet, Ansible, SaltStack, Fabric) to scale
and verify infrastructure readiness under attack.&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&quot;presentation&quot;&gt;Presentation&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;&#x2F;attachments&#x2F;56583_2013-10-18_DDoS_Survival-ISC2TC.pdf&quot;&gt;DDoS Survival&lt;&#x2F;a&gt;&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
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