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    <title>I Told You So, Volume 1 - network-baselining</title>
    <subtitle>Archive, Volume 1: conference talks and papers on security and risk, 2010 to 2018.</subtitle>
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    <updated>2016-07-20T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
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        <title>Threat Intelligence and Baselining</title>
        <published>2016-07-20T00:00:00+00:00</published>
        <updated>2016-07-20T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
        
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              Unknown
            
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        <content type="html" xml:base="https://blog.itys.net/vol1/posts/threat-intelligence-and-baselining-sans/">&lt;h2 id=&quot;summary&quot;&gt;Summary&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SANS @ Night session Threat Intelligence: Neighborhood Watch for Your
Networks &amp;amp; Why Baselining Matters, delivered by Matthew J. Harmon on July 20,
2016, explores how integrating crowdsourced Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) with
rigorous network baselining practices equips defenders to spot, prioritize, and
respond to threats before they escalate .&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&quot;state-of-cyber-security&quot;&gt;State of Cyber Security&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, Harmon frames the state of cybersecurity emphasizing that breaches are
inevitable against motivated adversaries and introduces the fundamentals of
threat intelligence. He walks through the CIAs 15 Axioms for Intelligence
Analysts, defines IoC types (DNS hosts, IPs, URLs, file hashes), and outlines
the CybOX, STIX, and TAXII standards for packaging and exchanging structured
threat data. A real-world case study shows how to trace a Dyreza banking-trojan
infection from anomalous traffic to phishing emails, package findings into a
STIX header, and share via TAXII. Harmon then compares commercial and
open-source intelligence feedsi ThreatConnect for expert-curated data and
CriticalStack Intel for aggregated TSV-formatted IoCs demonstrating how
organizations can leverage these resources for timely, actionable insight.&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&quot;baselining&quot;&gt;Baselining&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Next, the presentation pivots to the critical role of baselining: defenders must
know their normal network behavior to detect deviations. Harmon introduces key
open-source tools Bro (for traffic analysis), PRADS (for asset discovery), SGUIL
(for alert management), and LOKI (for IOC scanning)and shows how they integrate
within the Security Onion distribution. He provides a do-it-yourself lab
outline: install Security Onion, subscribe to CriticalStack feeds, configure Bro
and YARA rules, and deploy a network tap for continuous monitoring. By combining
structured threat intelligence with continuous baselining, organizations can
proactively identify both emerging campaigns and internal anomalies,
dramatically improving detection and response capabilities.&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&quot;presentation&quot;&gt;Presentation&lt;&#x2F;h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;&#x2F;attachments&#x2F;2016-07-20_Threat_Intelligence_and_Baselining-SANS.pdf&quot;&gt;Threat Intelligence and
Baselining&lt;&#x2F;a&gt;&lt;&#x2F;p&gt;
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